Moral Epistemology Editor

I am now the editor of the Moral Epistemology category on the PhilPapers website. Feel free to pass along any articles that could go under this category. I am responsible for organizing and populating this category with relevant research.

Epistemic Intuitions: Adopting a Distinction from Moral Philosophy

I’ve been thinking about two ways of understanding epistemic intuitions. The first view is the liberal view. This is the view proposed by Williamson, Ichikawa, Lewis and Van Inwagen. On this view intuitions are judgments or inclinations to judge. The motivation for this view is that it avoids psychologizing evidence. If intuitions are judgments, then they are not basic sources of evidence. They are more like acts of affirming a proposition rather than basic sources of evidence for the content of a proposition. The second view of intuitions is the restrictive view. According to this view intuitions are a special class of mental states and these mental states are capable of serving as evidence for the propositional content they represent.

In thinking about these two views it occurred to me that it is possible to adopt and adapt a distinction from moral philosophy. Consider reframing these two views in roughly the following way:

• Non-cognitivism (liberal): Intuitions do not evidence the truth of propositions. Intuitions are akin to attitudes of affirmation of propositional content, but they do not count as basic sources of evidence for that content. Intuitions have no truth conditions; they are more like utterances “Yes, that P” or “I agree that P.” Intuitions are attitudes of desire, approval or disapproval.
• Cognitivism (restrictive): Intuitions are states of mind (i.e., cognitive like beliefs are cognitive). Intuitions are able to evidence the truth or falsity of propositions. So, intuitions are capable of being basic sources of evidence.

Cast in this light, what can the debate over epistemic intuitions learn from the debate over the truth-value of moral propositions? Does this recasting of the debate over epistemic intuitions sharpen what is at stake?

Intuitions are not Inclinations to Believe

I am working on a response paper to a Phil Studies paper by Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux(henceforth, E & M). Their paper is found here.

In “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe” E & M argue intuitions do not play an evidential role. This thesis targets a particular dialectic. E & M recognize a false presupposition in the debate over whether intuitions should or should not play an evidential role. The false presupposition is that intuitions play an evidential role. Against this assumption E & M argue that intuitions do not in fact play an evidential role. They argue for this claim irrespective of whether or not intuitions should play such a role. Intuition-proponents claim intuitions are evidence, so they should play an evidential role. Intuition-opponents claim intuitions are not evidence, so they should not play an evidential role. Assumed within this dialectic is the idea that intuitions play an evidential role. Negating this assumption E & M appear to be putting forward a dialectic-changing thesis.[1] E & M’s thesis promises to generate new lines of research, overcome an exhausted debate that seems to run in circles, and better systematize the data of why intuitions appear to be used as evidence in philosophy but actually fail to be used as such. In my paper “Intuitions are not Inclinations to Believe” I argue against E & M’s thesis at length.

In this post, I propose a truncated argument against E & M’s overall thesis, an argument which is not found in my paper. Consider:

1. Intuitions cannot play an evidential role (ER) in philosophical inquiry (E & M’s 1^st thesis).
2. A non-evidential view explains why intuitions seem to play an ER even though they do not (E & M’s 2^nd thesis).
3. It is possible to argue intuitions do not play an ER irrespective of whether they should or should not play an ER (E & M assumption).
4. Philosophers think intuitions should or should not play an ER in relation to the evidential status (ES) of intuitions.[2]
5. E & M argue intuitions cannot play an ER by arguing intuitions are not-E (1 & 2). [3]
6. Thus, it is not possible to argue intuitions do not play an ER irrespective of whether they should or should not play an ER (~3).

Is this a viable argument against E & M’s position? At first glance, it seems to undercut E & M’s method of argument without getting into the details of their proposal. I address the details of their proposal in my paper.

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[1] This highlights the importance of arguing against E & M’s thesis. If it cannot be successfully defeated, whole modes of inquiry in philosophy need to be reevaluated or abandoned as futile.

[2] Philosophers argue intuitions should play an ER because they’re E or intuitions should not play and ER because they’re not-E.

[3] E & M must argue intuitions are not playing an ER and they’re not-E. If they said intuitions are not-ER and did not argue intuitions are not-E their position could be the inert view (not-ER, but E). This is a view E & M want to avoid. The move they do make takes a stand on the epistemic status of intuitions, namely, they have a negative ES (they’re not-E).

Intuitions as Enablers

Jonathan Ichikawa put forward an interesting idea on “intuitions as enablers” at the Arché Methodology blog. Access the discussion on this idea by clicking here.

Responsible Belief in the Face of Disagreement

I just discovered a conference concerning the value of knowledge and responsible belief. Full details here. Conference theme and keynote speakers found below.

Conference Theme

The ethics of belief and the phenomenon of disagreement are two epistemological topics that show an interesting revival during the last few decades. This conference aims to draw the two issues together: What is it to acquire or hold responsible belief on some issue if that issue is the subject of (fierce) controversy? How does the existence of (known) disagreement affect the epistemic status of our beliefs? And what sort of cognitive response is appropriate when one is confronted with opposed views on a subject matter considered? Some of the key questions and issues to be considered in this area include: Are we responsible for what we believe? If so, in what sense and if not, why do we often talk as if we are? Is there an ‘ethics of belief’? What are the norms, principles, obligations, and permissions that might constitute an ethics of belief? Are we to take responsibility for our beliefs and what does that amount to? Are beliefs in any sense under our voluntary control? Is our having responsibility for what we believe compatible with doxastic involuntarism? What is disagreement? Is there faultless disagreement? What is responsible belief when confronted with disagreement among one’s peers? What is responsible belief in the face of testimony to the contrary? Is belief in the face of disagreement ever responsible if one’s evidence is inconclusive?

Keynote Speakers

• Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)
• Richard Feldman (University of Rochester)
• Bruce Russell (Wayne State University)
• René van Woudenberg (VU University Amsterdam)

Rawls’ Views on Religion

An interesting article on Ralws’ views on  religion is found here. The article is written by Joshua Cohen and Thomas Nagel. Here’s a quote from the article:

the moral and social convictions that the thesis expresses in religious form are related in complex and illuminating ways to the central ideas of Rawls’s later writings on moral and political theory. His notions of sin, faith and community are simultaneously moral and theological, and despite fundamental differences they prefigure the moral outlook found in A Theory of Justice.

Methodology Conference Schedule Online

There is a methodology conference at Arché in April. The conference schedule has just been posted here. Of personal interest is Anand Vaidya’s talk on the value of philosophy. I’m currently taking an epistemology class from him and it has been a rewarding class. If his lectures are any indication of his presentation it should be a good presentation.

Conference: Ethics of Human Development and Global Justice

There is an interesting conference in Valencia, Spain (11/30-12/2). The CFP can be found here. Below is a summary of the objectives of the conference as explained on the conference website.

Achieving human development increasingly demands the joint work of political, economic and solidarity-building institutions and organizations. Also, it demands an active citizenship aware of the problem of poverty in its diverse dimensions. The premise of this conference is that no one should remain indifferent to the lack of freedom implied by conditions of extreme poverty or the impossibility for many people in the planet to fully develop their capabilities. The objective of the conference is to advance towards determining which responsibilities should be taken by each of the relevant actors in human development. It aims to gather intellectuals, educators, policy makers and practitioners to reflect about what are the fundamental demands of development ethics and global justice in their respective roles and tasks. They will be asked to reflect also on the means that may promote education for development and to share their experiences in their fight against poverty, with a special focus on the relations between theory and practice.

APA Petitions: DeRose, Contracts & Practices

Now, Keith DeRose has written a letter to the APA found here. His letter is a moderate attempt at providing the APA with a way forward. His approach is moderate because it involves the APA enforcing their anti-discrimination policy against Christian universities without claiming the Christian policies are illegal or immoral. DeRose asks that Christian universities who advertise in ‘Jobs for Philosophers’ are branded in the following way:

The schools would indeed be marked, but the precise and accurate way to express how they would be “officially” “branded” is as: engaging in unethical discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

DeRose’s concession reminds me of the steroid controversy in baseball. Though they are not exactly analogous scenarios DeRose’s solution reminds me of placing an asterisk next to the records of baseball players who were associated with steroid use. However, DeRose wants to remain agnostic about whether these schools have actually engaged in discrimination. He even admits that he does not know if the schools actually use their policies to fire faculty found guilty of homosexual behavior. As DeRose says in a footnote:

My own views here are very complicated and in many places unsettled, often involving multiple levels of evaluation (what’s right policy given certain broader goals vs. whether those broader goals are themselves justified, etc.) and I didn’t want to muddy the waters with them, especially since I haven’t looked into the important details of these policies and how they’re practiced in the schools in question.

So, DeRose’s moderate proposal involves marking schools as “engaging in unethical discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation” without knowing whether they have used their conduct policies to engage in such discrimination. This proposal is akin in intent to placing an asterisk next to all records accomplished by all baseball sluggers who played during the steroid era. It is akin to saying that these players might have engaged in such activity, so their records should be regarded under this assumption. Such branding is to exist in spite of soild evidence that such players have ever engaged in steroid use. It is guilt by association without proof of guilt. Christian universities are to be similarly branded, as “engaging in unethical discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation” without proof of such activity. Perhaps there is a better way to look at this situation.

The best way to view a conduct policy is as a contract. If the contract in question is discriminatory, then the question is how Christian schools should be advised to revise their policies? I have briefly discussed these possibilities in a post found here. The best way forward for the APA is bound-up with the best way forward for Christian universities. Branding the contract as discriminatory is not the same thing as branding the practices as discriminatory unless the universities use their contract to discriminate on the basis of sexual identity. This amounts to a contract/practice distinction.

On both sides of this discussion people are operating under the assumption that a discriminatory contract begets discriminatory practices. This brings up some questions. How seriously are social contracts taken? Are Christian conduct policies on par with legal contracts? Are the contracts legally binding or merely a contract of understanding that one will be a virtuous member of the Christian university community? Is signing the contract necessary for employment? Has employment been denied solely on the basis of someone not signing the contract?

My intuition concerning this entire hubbub is that a big deal has been made of nothing. Not because discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not a big deal, but because it has not been established that Christian universities take these contracts seriously and systematically apply them in making hiring and firing decisions. The way forward needs to be made not for the APA in isolation of Christian universities. Instead, the APA needs to provide a way for Christian universities. Perhaps this would include a grace period for the universities to revise their contracts or otherwise produce evidence against discriminatory practices. DeRose’s proposal is like giving the university a “time-out” without setting terms for what it required to avoid a “time-out” in the future. Do Christian universities need to secularize their contracts, produce evidence of not applying contracts to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, or can Christian universities continue to operate as Christian universities by requiring of faculty a standard of conduct consistent with Christian principles?

APA Petitions – A Sensible Alternative has Emerged!

Finally, a sensible alternative to the petition and counter-petition has emerged. Mark Murphy, a philosopher at Georgetown University, has drafted a letter to the APA describing why censuring Christian universities is not warranted. Mark is soliciting feedback on the letter until March 31. I recommend you check out the letter here. Send him any feedback you have either pro or con. His email address is at the bottom of the letter.